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3 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOME HISTORICAL 
COMMENTS 
Lawrence M. Friedman∗ 
This is a symposium on access to justice, a symposium with contribu-
tions from quite a few distinguished experts.  Here, at the outset of the con-
ference, I want to set out some modest preliminary thoughts on what 
“access to justice” might mean, and comment on how access to justice has 
fared historically. 
We have to begin with some attempt to explain what we are talking 
about.  What do we mean by “access to justice”?  In order to answer that 
question, we have to ask some other, more basic, questions: who is sup-
posed to have access; to what; and for what purpose? 
Today, when people talk about “access to justice,” it seems to me that 
they have a particular image in mind.  They are thinking of a person, or an 
organization, with some sort of legitimate claim or complaint.  The ques-
tion is whether there is a realistic and practical way of turning this claim 
into reality, and of pursuing this complaint.  For criminal defendants, the 
claim is to a fair and honest trial or some similar proceeding.  Another as-
pect—and an important one—is access to information.  In England, there 
are advice bureaus that inform people about their legal rights.  In this coun-
try, more and more, the web serves up information that is often quite rich 
and accurate. 
We can ask, also, what is the “justice” we are referring to in the phrase 
“access to justice?”  Does it mean the formal judicial system, so that si-
phoning off cases or shunting them into other arenas is arguably a denial of 
access to justice?  Most people would not accept this position.  There is no 
need to equate justice solely within the formal judicial system.  There are 
many other methods of resolving disputes—arbitration, mediation, and so 
on—which may work better, and even more justly, than resorting to the 
formal court system.  These alternatives are not necessarily a good thing.  
Mandatory arbitration, as we all know, can be, and has been, criticized on a 
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number of grounds.  Access to this kind of alternative way of settling a dis-
pute would not be access to justice, at least in certain circumstances. 
So far, we have talked about access to justice in basically procedural 
terms.  But the phrase can also mean something quite different.  “Justice” 
might refer not to an institution or a process, but to a concrete result—that 
is, “justice” in the sense of a fair outcome, or getting one’s due.  The Su-
preme Court of the United States has suggested that it is valid (constitu-
tionally speaking) to execute an innocent man, as long as he has had a fair 
trial.1  I suspect most ordinary people, as long as legal training has not 
mangled their minds, would find this both bizarre and revolting.  Justice to 
most of us is, above all, an outcome. 
The people who work to improve access to justice are usually concerned 
about the problems of specific people or groups.  They are thinking about 
the poor, or the middle class, or both.  They are thinking about a miscella-
neous collection  of downtrodden, unpopular, or marginal people—whether 
they are Gypsies, convicted criminals, aliens, high school students, or 
members of unpopular religious sects.  Thus, the ideal program of activists 
who want to increase access to justice would be to empower those individ-
uals and groups who are somehow prevented from getting their just deserts. 
Improving access to justice can be, in short, a procedural or an institu-
tional issue; and, at the same time, a substantive issue.  It is also very much 
a matter of economics.  Justice can be expensive.  If justice is too expen-
sive, it has to be subsidized.  This is the essence of the famous Gideon case, 
which is discussed below.  The ideal system of justice would be cheap and 
convenient, open to the claims of the underdogs, and would give partici-
pants, within reason, what they want—provided that what they want is 
what society agrees they ought to have.  Cheapness and convenience, while 
obviously important, are hollow and meaningless without a working system 
of relevant rights.  We can give people, for example, the right to a hearing, 
a free lawyer, and all the rest, but if the legal rules and practices are dead 
set against our man, due process is not much help. 
This is not idle conjecture.  In the history of legal systems, cheap and 
convenient courts have not been rare.  In fact, it is the modern, formal, 
slow, and expensive systems that are exceptional.  Tribal justice is quick 
and cheap.  Anthropologists have studied quite a few native systems of dis-
pute resolution and have never reported on instances where it takes two 
years to hear a case.  Justice among these people is usually what Max We-
ber called khadi justice—the informal folk-justice of the wise man sitting 
 
 1. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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under a tree.2  Historically, justice has usually been speedy and inexpen-
sive. 
We do not have to visit tribes in the South Seas, or in the Amazon jun-
gle, to find this kind of justice or something like it.  The rich, full records of 
American colonial courts also document a system that was cheap, quick, 
and within everyone’s reach.  In the tiny towns of New England in the se-
venteenth century, local courts were extremely accessible—and not only 
accessible, but accessed in fact.  One could almost compile an accurate 
census of a given town just by listing the people who appeared in court 
records during a particular year.  Practically all adults came to court, or 
were dragged into court, at one point in time for some purpose.  For the ni-
neteenth century, one might also mention the courts of frontier communi-
ties, or Alan Steinberg’s study of the courts of Philadelphia,3 or, for that 
matter, municipal courts, police courts, and justice courts almost every-
where—all of these tended to be examples of cheap and accessible legal 
systems. 
One could also mention small claims courts.  The idea behind the crea-
tion of these courts was to open the courthouse doors to the little guy.  
Small claims courts were supposed to dispense simple, modest justice, 
without lawyers and the hassle of formal procedures.  The little guy was 
indeed present in these courts, but more often as defendant rather than as 
plaintiff.  Small claims courts often acted as glorified collection agencies: 
companies valued them as a cheap way to collect debts; collection agencies 
often appeared and filed suit.4  This situation, while a key function of the 
courts, was not at all the goal of crusaders for access to justice.  These 
courts, however, were frequently useful to consumers in disputed cases.5 
Access to justice is not just a matter of courts in the basement of the 
house of justice.  Many legal developments in the late twentieth century 
had a real impact on access to justice.  Laws were passed that opened the 
way into the legal system for the underdogs, or the lawyers who 
 
 2. See MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 213 (Max 
Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Simon & Schuster 1954) (1925). 
 3. ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PHILADELPHIA, 
1800-1880 (1989). 
 4. Steven Weller, John C. Ruhnka & John A. Martin, American Small Claims Courts, 
in SMALL CLAIMS COURTS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 5, 9-10 (Christopher J. Whelan ed., 
1990). 
 5. See Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and 
an Empirical Investigation, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (1984) (a study of a Canadian small 
claims court).  Collection cases were by far the most frequent when there was a default 
judgment but consumers contested some cases and, on the whole, did well. 
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represented them.  Civil rights laws are a striking example.  These laws 
came about because of massive social change, aided and abetted by strong 
social movements, including the civil rights movement, the feminist 
movement, and many other movements demanding rights for aliens, illegi-
timate children, students, prisoners, sexual minorities, Native Americans, 
elderly people, and handicapped people.  The main outlines of this devel-
opment are familiar to everyone.  Also worth noting here is the so-called 
liability explosion in the law of torts and claims for wrongful dismissal 
from a job.  These legal changes had one crucial element in common: they 
empowered plaintiffs; and plaintiffs were, on the whole, the little people, 
the underdogs, the disadvantaged.  This is also true of products liability and 
medical malpractice.  Obviously, you don’t have to be poor to be incine-
rated in a defective automobile, or sliced and diced by a careless surgeon; 
even those not usually disadvantaged become the little guy in the face of 
giant corporations or huge hospitals and their insurance companies. 
Civil rights laws empowered victims, invented substantive rights, and 
gave them teeth—the Voting Rights Law, for example―and quite literally 
created rights of access.  The Civil Rights Act established an Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and invited people to file their claims 
with the agency; thousands of people have done so. 
Modern government is administrative government—completing work, 
on the whole, through boards, agencies, and commissions.  In the United 
States, more so than in many other countries, the bureaucracy has to reckon 
with interest groups and the general public.  Proposed rules and regulations 
have to be published in the Federal Register.  Often, the agency holds pub-
lic hearings and invites comments from the public.  Citizens and pressure 
groups have many chances to voice their opinions, and they often do: labor 
unions, public interest law firms, employer trade associations, and envi-
ronmental protection organizations are all likely to weigh in on proposals 
for administrative action.  And there is fertile soil here, too, for litigation.  
Robert Kagan has called the American way of law adversarial legalism.6  It 
has its costs and benefits.  The system is extremely slow and inefficient 
compared to administrative processes in most other countries, but it is al-
most pathologically open.  In some situations, there is so much access that 
plans, projects, and rules die a slow and lingering death, smothered by law-
suits and murdered through litigation. 
This, then, is a complex situation.  “Adversarial legalism” grants access 
to the administrative process.  This can be a good thing when the process 
 
 6. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:  THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
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delays or kills bad projects; but the same fate can befall good projects.  One 
also wants to ask the more general question: how much access to justice do 
we really want?  Let us try to imagine a world in which everyone who had 
any claim whatsoever could get a hearing, had inexpensive and convenient 
access to counsel, and presumably could get his claim resolved in his favor.  
Would this be a good society?  It could be an Orwellian nightmare. 
There are millions of disputes or potential disputes in society that never 
get resolved.  Often, it is simply not worth the time and money to resolve 
them.  Suppose you live in a large apartment building.  You play music, a 
bit loud maybe, until ten o’clock at night.  A neighbor, who goes to bed at 
nine, complains and asks you to please stop.  You politely refuse, which 
ends the matter most of the time.  Suppose the neighbor could easily, with-
out cost or fuss, bring you before some sort of apartment tribunal.  In some 
socialist countries, peoples’ courts took advantage of informer networks, 
nosy neighbors, and government spies, to control or harass citizens.  But 
this is not likely to make for a better society.  There are times and places 
where complexities such as cost and fuss have virtues, such as preventing 
outbursts of small, annoying claims and disputes that would be better off 
forgotten.  A more complex system might be called a system of reciprocal 
immunities: your neighbor, for example, cannot sue you and you cannot 
sue him—at least not easily. 
I want to stress that I am not generalizing this situation to cover the 
whole legal system.  I am certainly not trying to criticize the movement to 
increase access to justice.  I am entirely sympathetic with this movement.  I 
merely want to raise some questions and point out some limits. 
As we know, most disputes never turn into grievances or claims or com-
plaints.  Actual litigation is the tip of a pyramid, while the broader base of 
the pyramid consists of a vast number of incidents that might conceivably 
turn into claims, but usually do not.  This was the finding of the well-
known Wisconsin study of civil litigation.7  No one argues that the pyramid 
currently has the optimal shape; we can imagine a pyramid with different 
dimensions which would be more to our liking—more people would have 
more access to justice—and these people would be, on the whole, the 
people we want to help.  But we cannot have a system that provides unli-
mited access to justice; the pyramid must remain a pyramid rather than be-
come a square. 
 
 7. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Trans-
formation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). 
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The reader will object, correctly, to increased access to justice in matters 
such as disputes among neighbors, or the use of small claims courts as col-
lection agencies, or even the multiplicity of divorces—but this is not really 
what we are talking about.  We are talking about giving the poor and the 
downtrodden access to justice.  We want to unlock the courtrooms and oth-
er institutions to give these new “customers” a chance to say their piece and 
assert their claims of right.  We are talking about empowering the poor and 
downtrodden, not in order to start legal quarrels with their neighbors, but to 
give them tools and weapons against the high and mighty: corporations, 
government agencies, big landlords, and chain stores. 
This is the heart of what people mean when they talk about access to jus-
tice.  But should we also help people in their claims against each other?  
Sometimes this may be useful.  The long-term dispute over easy or hard di-
vorce is really a dispute about one form of access.  Because many people 
were committed to the notion that divorce was evil, law and practice kept 
divorce difficult and expensive.  The enemies of divorce were, for years, 
rather successful—not in preventing the disintegration of families, but in 
preventing disintegrating families from taking advantage of this branch of 
law. 
Over the years, however, divorce has become more democratic.  In Eng-
land, only Parliament could grant a divorce until 1857.  That meant no di-
vorce at all, practically speaking, except for the occasional duke or prince 
or merchant baron.  Parliament finally passed a divorce law in 1857, which 
somewhat broadened access to divorce.  It shifted the forum for divorce 
from Parliament to the courts.  But divorce remained hard to get and ex-
tremely expensive—a deliberate choice because nobody wanted to encour-
age divorce. 
The situation in the United States was much more complex.  Divorce 
was available in almost every state (South Carolina was an exception) by 
the late nineteenth century, but it was an adversarial lawsuit: a plaintiff had 
to allege “grounds” for divorce, a lawyer was essential, and it was signifi-
cantly costly. 
Then, in 1970, California passed a no-fault divorce law, making divorce, 
compared to before, both cheap and easy.  The new law, which quickly 
spread to other states, increased access to the divorce courts for ordinary 
people.  Yet, the consequences are unknown.  Does easy divorce hurt fami-
lies?  Many people argue that marriage should be a life-long commitment; 
troubled couples should try to work out their problems instead of running 
to the divorce court.  On the other hand, whether a tough divorce law ac-
tually keeps families from breaking up is extremely dubious. 
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The general point could be put this way: many rules, procedures, and in-
stitutions affect access to justice.  Some make it easier, some make it hard-
er.  Do we always want easier access?  That depends, first of all, on who 
the “we” might be.  Access for one person, A, might be good for A but bad 
for his opponent, B.  Even if we know who the “we” might be, whether 
access is good or bad for society is situation-specific.  There is no general 
answer to the question.  It depends on where one’s sympathies lie. 
Take, for example, the development of the contingent fee.  It is more 
than a century old.  It has been severely criticized at times; but it survives.  
Without it, many men and women would be unable to sue for injuries in 
accidents, and only those who could afford a lawyer’s hourly rates would 
be likely to go to court.  The contingent fee, then, in a real sense increases 
access to justice in tort cases. 
The same point can be made about some class actions; they aggregate 
clusters of claims that otherwise would not or could not be brought.  De-
spite the benefits provided by the class action mechanism in some contexts, 
there is significant backlash against class actions and many kinds of tort ac-
tions.  Millions of people, encouraged by the media and by business inter-
ests, think that the tort system has run amok.  The case of the woman who 
bought hot coffee at McDonald’s and spilled it on herself is (mis)taken as a 
prime example of what’s wrong with our legal order.8  To many people, 
such as business leaders, conservatives, doctors petrified of malpractice, 
and municipalities frightened of lawsuits, the problem here is too much 
access, too many lawsuits.  The result, it is said, is not justice but economic 
inefficiency and waste. 
On the other side, there is, for example, the well-known case, Ledbetter, 
which the Supreme Court decided in 2007.9  Lilly Ledbetter worked at a 
plant in Alabama from 1979 to 1998, mostly as an area manager.  She filed 
a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
complaining that men doing similar jobs earned more money than she did, 
in violation of the Civil Rights Act.  She won her case before a jury, but, by 
law, any challenge to an employment practice had to be filed with the 
EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory practice.  The Supreme Court 
said, by a five to four margin, that this meant Lilly Ledbetter could com-
plain only about discrimination in the last three months of her job. 
 
 8. Michael McCann, William Haltom & Anne Bloom, Java Jive: Genealogy of a Ju-
ridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2001); see also Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logic 
of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insur-
ance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L. POL., & SOC’Y 95 (1991). 
 9. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
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The majority claimed, perhaps a bit disingenuously, that they were simp-
ly applying the statute “as written.”10  One hundred and eighty days means 
one hundred and eighty days.  It cannot mean years and years.  Congress 
might have had good reasons to attach a short time limit.  The provision 
might have reflected a “strong preference for the prompt resolution of em-
ployment discrimination allegations.”11  Evidence of discriminatory intent 
“may fade quickly with time,”12 making cases harder to prove or disprove. 
The dissenters accused the majority of a callous disregard of life in the 
real world.  People are usually quite secretive about their pay rates—pay 
disparities “often occur . . . in small increments”13 and a woman’s suspi-
cion about discrimination “develops . . . over time,”14 in this type of case. 
The decision was widely criticized, often on the grounds that it was un-
realistic, but perhaps that is a misunderstanding.  The majority side simply 
might not like this kind of case because their sympathies are with business 
defendants besieged and harassed with discrimination suits.  For business 
defendants, the fewer of these cases the better.  Justices who agreed would 
be tempted to read the statute as narrowly as possible in order to cut off an-
noying and unjustified lawsuits.  In this instance, Congress disagreed with 
the Court and passed a law to undo the Ledbetter case.15 
The Ledbetter issue is a general issue of access—or of encouraging or 
discouraging lawsuits. The access issue lies behind several decisions, in-
cluding those about standing, statutes of limitation, and lawyers’ fees (par-
ticularly in cases brought by public interest groups).16  The literature, the 
legal profession as a whole, and probably most of the public express the 
view that litigation is something evil, something to be avoided.  Settling out 
of court is always, or almost always, preferable.  Undoubtedly, there is a lot 
to be said for this idea, but the emphasis on settling cases is not always po-
litically neutral.  What of the view that class action cases are usually an un-
justified nuisance put together by lawyers hungry for business?  The most 
strident criticism hails from the right end of the political spectrum.  If you 
believe that the business of America is business, then class actions are 
usually a plague on the system, rather than an example of justice at work. 
 
 10. Id. at 642. 
 11. Id. at 619. 
 12. Id. at 631. 
 13. Id. at 645 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
 16. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
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I could multiply instances, but the central point is simply that who gains 
and who loses is the heart of the matter in cases involving access to justice.  
This is no secret.  It is rarely accidental (or purely technical) to cut off 
access or to make it tough and costly.  These are policy decisions, whether 
explicit or implicit.  Nor is access to justice a question of procedure alone.  
It cannot be reformed merely by tinkering with institutions.  Of course, 
there can be marginal improvements, but if you define the present situation 
as a problem, then the solution must come from broad, deep, lasting social 
change.  There was, for example, little or no access to justice for African-
Americans in the South until the 1950s.  There is much more today—and 
anyone trying to explain the before and the after in terms of procedural ni-




In criminal justice, there is one clear-cut issue: due process.  The United 
States Constitution—to be more precise, the Bill of Rights—is much con-
cerned with protecting the rights of people accused of crimes.  The Bill of 
Rights is basically a mini-code of criminal justice—many of its provisions 
relate to criminal trials and this was no accident.  The provisions arose out 
of a climate of fear of political influence on the judicial system.  The rebel-
lious colonists thought that justice in the hands of the King and his agents 
was an instrument of tyranny.  They also thought it would be folly to hand 
criminal justice over to a new central government without safeguards 
against abuse. 
Once the country was independent, fear of the central government did 
not last long.  By the late nineteenth century, people saw danger to society, 
not from a strong central government (there was none), but from the crimi-
nals themselves—the home-grown dregs of society.  The enemy was not 
Washington, D.C., but thugs, low-lives, and criminals of all sorts.  The pas-
sion for due process went to sleep and was revived only in the age of the 
civil rights movement, which, in turn, was part of a broader revolt of the 
underdogs. 
The story, however, is quite complicated.  Any discussion of the subject 
has to pay homage to Gideon v. Wainwright,17 a shining light from the 
Warren court.  Clarence Gideon, charged with a serious crime, was too 
poor to hire a lawyer, and asked the court to provide one.18  Florida, his ju-
 
 17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 18. Id. at 337. 
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risdiction, did not provide for counsel in such cases.19  The Supreme Court 
reversed Gideon’s conviction on the grounds that, in serious cases, the state 
must provide a lawyer for the indigent.20  Defending a criminal case is 
tough, technical work.  The Court felt that the right to counsel provided by 
the Bill of Rights demanded some provision for a state-paid lawyer if the 
defendant had no money.  On retrial, with a skilled lawyer, Gideon won an 
acquittal.21 
Gideon and cases like it rest on the assumption that the criminal defen-
dant is helpless without a lawyer’s help.  Access to (criminal) justice would 
be otherwise meaningless.  Gideon came out of Florida and showcased the 
Supreme Court in one of its most useful roles: crafting a national standard 
to be imposed on states that are statistical outliers.  By the 1960s, most 
states had long since recognized the right which Gideon made general; and 
the federal government, in 1938, accorded that right to federal prisoners.22  
In 1942, in Betts v. Brady,23 the Supreme Court declined to impose the 
Gideon rule on state courts, yet the Court soon began to have second 
thoughts.  In 1949, in Gibbs v. Burke,24 the defendant, Gibbs, was arrested 
in Pennsylvania for larceny and pleaded not guilty.  He had no lawyer and 
tried to conduct his own defense.25  The jury convicted him, and the judge 
sentenced him to “imprisonment in the Eastern State Penitentiary at solitary 
confinement and hard labor for two and a half to five years.”26  The Su-
preme Court reversed on appeal on the grounds that, while under Betts 
there was no automatic right to counsel, “where the ignorance, youth, or 
other incapacity of the defendant” would make a “trial without counsel un-
fair” there is indeed such a right.27  Gibbs’s trial did not measure up to the 
standard of due process.  The case was a straw in the wind; Betts v. Brady 
was formally overruled in Gideon.28 
In the states, probably the first stage in the development of the right to 
counsel was a recognition that courts could, in their discretion, provide a 
lawyer for a criminal defendant.  In an old Indiana case, Webb v. Baird,29 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 339-40. 
 21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1963). 
 22. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938). 
 23. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 24. 337 U.S. 773 (1949). 
 25. Id. at 774. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 780. 
 28. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 29. 6 Ind. 13 (1854). 
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Baird, a practicing attorney, sued to collect twenty-five dollars for defend-
ing one Thomas Wickens, who had been indicted for burglary.  Baird had 
done this work “under the order and by the direction of” the Circuit Court 
of Tippecanoe County.30  The Supreme Court of Indiana thought it was in-
conceivable, in a “civilized community,” that “any citizen . . . put in jeo-
pardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too 
poor to employ such.”31 
In some states, the courts appointed attorneys to represent indigent de-
fendants.  The first state to have full-time, paid public defenders was Cali-
fornia in the 1920s.  The idea came from Clara Foltz, the first woman law-
yer in the state.  A number of other states followed the lead of California.  
All this took place long before Gideon. 
Gideon was important, nonetheless—not only because it forced the na-
tional standard down the throats of laggard states, but because it was part of 
a package of cases in which the Warren court tried to improve criminal jus-
tice.  The famous case, Miranda v. Arizona,32 also was significant with re-
gard to the issue of access to justice.  Miranda was an attempt to curb the 
vast discretion of the police, which was often abused.  There was a great 
deal of outright brutality as well as more subtle psychological coercion—
these tactics were designed to induce defendants to confess, both by fair 
means and foul.  The Warren Court felt that justice inside the courtroom 
and during the trial would be too little and too late without some safeguards 
at the time of arrest.33  Defendants should know they have a right to remain 
silent and a right to refuse to answer questions.34 
The chief complaint against Miranda—and, to a degree, against the oth-
er Warren court cases (though not Gideon)—is that these decisions ham-
string the police.  Most ordinary people probably approve of police discre-
tion and police power.  The police know how to handle criminals and 
sometimes rather harsh measures are useful or even necessary.  The right to 
beat up suspects, and to cover up this practice, is not found in any criminal 
code, but public indifference or outright approval provide cover for police 
 
 30. Id. at 14. 
 31. Id. at 18.  In a case decided the year before in Indiana, Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 
(1853), the court of Common Pleas had assigned James E. Blythe, an attorney, as counsel to 
defend a man charged with larceny.  Blythe refused to do this unless he was paid; the court 
found him guilty of contempt.  The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed on the grounds that 
the trial court had no right to order Blythe to work without getting paid. Blythe, 4 Ind. at 
525. 
 32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 33. Id. at 467. 
 34. Id. at 467-68. 
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behavior.  Historically, vague laws against vagrancy, loitering, disturbing 
the peace, and the like also expanded police discretion.  These laws gave 
the police the (apparent) right to sweep undesirables off the streets.  The 
victims of these sweeps had no recourse, no right to complain, at least noth-
ing with any practical value. 
Criminal justice practice has moved some distance from those bad, old 
days.  Today, the police are less lawless, although each year there are 
enough brutality scandals to make one wonder.  The overall questions re-
main: how much due process can society afford?  How much is desirable?  
How much access to justice do people deserve when they are accused (of-
ten correctly) of breaking the law? 
Most people would answer with a sliding scale.  A man or woman facing 
the death penalty requires a lot more lawyerly protection than somebody 
facing a fine for a parking ticket.  Indeed, even in the days before Gideon, 
Florida law acknowledged that the state had the duty to help a person who 
was accused of a capital crime.  In fact, by 1931, every state provided for 
some sort of assignment of counsel if a poor person faced a possible death 
sentence. 
Whether people actually get enough help in these cases, and in criminal 
justice in general, is quite dubious.  In November 2008, The New York 
Times reported a kind of revolt “in at least seven states,” by public defend-
ers who refused to take on new cases, “citing overwhelming workloads.”35  
Budget cuts had pushed them to the breaking point.36  In death penalty cas-
es, the problem is much, much worse.  These are difficult cases under any 
circumstances.  Modern death penalty statutes, complex and involute, make 
them even more difficult.  There is a good deal of evidence that defendants 
very often do not get good lawyers and good lawyering in these cases.  In-
adequate counsel may serve as grounds for reversing such cases.  In 2003, 
the Court in Wiggins v. Smith did exactly this: the quality of the defense, 
the court felt, fell below minimal constitutional standards.37  In general, 
however, courts have been loath to reverse on grounds of inadequate coun-
sel.  Moreover, even with skilled lawyers at work, the pay is often sub-par 
and there is no money to buy the services of forensic experts.  The state, on 
the other hand, can spend and spend if it wishes. 
There is no mystery here, any more than in the civil cases.  The public 
demands toughness in criminal justice.  The death penalty is fairly popular 
 
 35. Eric Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2008, at A1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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in most states.  The men and women on trial are not the kind of people the 
rest of us sympathize with.  Society would probably be better off without 
some of them.  The public is impatient with the niceties of due process.  
Can you think of a movie or a TV show which glorified due process, access 
to justice, and the heady strictures of the Bill of Rights?  There may be a 
few, but very few.  On the contrary, most movies and TV shows fall into 
one of two categories: either they glorify the law and order side, and imply 
that killing off the bad guys is a good thing, or they show the police as just 
as dishonest and corrupt as the criminals.  This cynicism makes it more dif-
ficult to run a fair, honest system and justifies a kind of vigilante attitude 
toward crime and disorder. 
In the 1983 movie, Star Chamber,38 Michael Douglas plays a judge in 
Los Angeles presiding over the trial of two vicious criminals who raped 
and killed a young boy.  Douglas’s character finds himself forced to let 
them go on a technicality.  Later, he finds out about a group of judges who 
meet secretly at night, retry the bad guys they had to let go in the daytime 
because of technicalities, sentence them to death, and arrange for a hitman 
to kill them.  Douglas’s character joins the group.  There is a twist at the 
end, which I will omit in case readers might want to rent the movie.  What 
is interesting is that the movie portrays judges who operate their own pri-
vate death squad with the utmost sympathy, at least at first.  Despite the 
ending, the movie never so much as hints that the “technicalities” are good 
for society; quite the contrary. 
In conclusion, access to justice is a complex issue, both in civil and 
criminal justice.  Access to justice is not merely a matter of procedure.  Nor 
is the problem one of technical failings in the house of justice.  The issue is 
deeply substantive and normative.  A solution to the “problem” depends on 
how the problem is defined and what policy goals one wishes to reach. 
 
 38. STAR CHAMBER (Twentieth Century Fox 1983). 
